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(Abstract)
It is widely known that Plato seems to be committed in a number of dialogues to the
view that all perfections are “united” — whether such unity is construed as identity, which
doesn’t lack textual evidence, or, more probably, as some kind of mutual “supervenience”.
(See for instance Laches 199e3-4, Alcib. I 114d-116d, Protag. 329c-333d & 349a-c.) Whatever
the solution to those interpretive problems is, what anyway can be ascertained is that, when
writing the Statesman, our philosopher is keen on maintaining that not only is it not the case
that all perfections are identical, but, moreover, some perfections do in fact clash with others,
which means that a thing can possess one of them only to the extent it lacks the opposite
perfection. However, as we’re going to see straight away, the Statesman’s main purpose and
thrust is likely to be that of emphasizing the necessity of some unity among opposite qualities.
The significance of such a contention can be set off against what will become the Aris-
totelian (and in effect the commonly received) view on the topic. In the Statesman Plato
recognizes that in each case there is some desirable mean between the extremes, but where
it lies changes according to circumstances. Trying to secure that convenient mean doesn’t
debar us from loking upon the extremes under consideration as virtues or perfections
themselves.
Thus, when the Statesman is drawing towards its conclusion, the Foreigner abruptly
brings up the issue of υpiερβολην και την ελλειψιν (283c3-4), and thereby that of the art
of measuring (η µετρητικη). Immediately the problem arises of the relations between the
opposite extremes. In Theaet. 152d, 157a, 160b-c, it appears that Plato distinguishes relative
from non-relative properties or determinations in the same way as he does between empirical,
earthly, changeable things and the Forms. Yet in his later dialogues Plato is clearly committed
to holding the view that the Forms themselves enter a number of relations, and even that
some Forms partake of others.
Since very early onwards he seems to have been concerned about some reciprocal rela-
tivity of opposite qualities (there are many places where such relativity is stressed, as Charm.
168b5-169a5, Phaed. 102c, Hipp. Mai. 288e1-281d11, Resp. IV 438b-c. Thus in those dialogues
Plato seems to have regarded mutually opposite properties as related mainly (if not only)
to one another and to nothing else (notwithstanding the difficulty stemming from his strong
leaning towards a conception of Forms as utterly non-relative). Now (283d6ff) an important
distinction is made between such mutual relatedness and a quite different one, in virtue of
which each of the opposite qualities is related to την του µετριου ϕυσιν (383e3) —
equivalently το µετριον (283e11) and (284c1) την του µετριου γενεσιν, and probably
τακριβες (284d2). Such relatedness is in fact much more important. Plato compares such
finding with his having compelled Nonbeing to be (284b7). Inbetweenness among the extremes
thus characterizes whatever the arts deal with (284e6-8).
So Plato seems very close to [what we are entitled to call] the Aristotelian view. But
such appearance vanishes very soon, when (starting on 306a9ff) the Foreigner argues for the
thesis that prudence and manliness, while being both parts of virtue — and so virtues themselves
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—, engage nonetheless in a fierce mutual enmity, which confessedly is an amazing claim
(306b13-c1).
In the same way as in Sophist and in Parm. Plato argues for the mutual community
and interconnectedness of Forms (even of opposite Forms which thus emerge as not entirely
contrary to one another), now he proves that manliness and prudence — as well as many related
qualities — can be mixed or mingled (or combined, or joined together: 308c6, 308e7, 308e9,
309b2, 309b7, 311a6; the words used are: συµµειξις, συνδειν, συµpiλεκειν, κοινωνειν,
συγκρασις, and also [310a4-5] a very divine tie [ϑειοτερον δεσµον] among the parts of
virtue which are discordant by nature and drift towards opposite extremes: 310a4-5).
By the way, an apparent difficulty can be easily dispelled: isn’t Plato on 307c4-5 con-
tending that opposite virtues do not consort with one another, that they are not to be found
together in action? Yes, but only σχεδον ως το piολυ: 307c2: almost always, or in the main.
Plainly Plato is here availing himself, at least in part, of the same words he also uses
in other late dialogues in order to convey his new approach to Forms, as enjoying mutual
participation and community, even when they happen to be contrary among themselves
(contrariness turns out to be only real up to a point, never absolute). The final lesson of the
Statesman is thus a confirmation of Plato’s late doctrine of the unity of opposites and some
compatibility of sorts between being-so and not-being-so, in virtue of the existence of degrees.
(Which of course doesn’t entail total rejection of the principle of noncontradiction, but rather
a qualification thereof.) The statesman’s art is wisdom to find the suitable degree in each
case, to accomplish the just alloy or admixture of opposite characters and qualities so as to
produce a good citizenry.
